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Abstract. In this paper, we focus on demand side management in consumer col-
lectives with community owned renewable energy generation and storage facil-
ities for effective integration of renewable energy with the existing fossil fuel-
based power supply system. The collective buys energy as a group through a
central coordinator who also decides about the storage and usage of renewable
energy. produced by the collective. Our objective is to design coordination algo-
rithms to minimize the cost of electricity consumption of the consumer collective
while allowing the consumers to make their own consumption decisions based
on their private consumption constraints and preferences. Minimizing the cost
is not only of interest to the consumers but is also socially desirable because
it reduces the consumption at times of peak demand (since differential pricing
mechanisms like time-of-use pricing is usually used by electricity companies to
discourage consumption at times of peak demand). We develop an iterative co-
ordination algorithm in which the coordinator makes the storage decision and
shapes the demands of the consumers by designing a virtual price signal for the
agents. We prove that our algorithm converges, and it achieves the optimal solu-
tion under realistic conditions We also present simulation results based on real
world consumption data to quantify the performance of our algorithm.
1 Introduction
Facing the rapid depletion of fossil fuel reserves and the increasing carbon emission,
one main objective in energy industry is to reduce the usage of fossil fuels for electricity
generation. This can be achieved by (a) increasing the penetration of renewable energy
sources in (e.g., wind energy, solar energy) in electricity supply and (b) reducing the
usage of fossil fuel-powered generators that are usually used to meet peak demand by
shifting energy use of consumers at peak demand. To enhance the penetration of re-
newable energy sources in electricity supply, there has been several recent initiatives at
using community-owned generation facilities for supplying part of the electricity needs
of a community [1]. To reduce the variation of supply of renewable energy sources due
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to uncontrolled factors like weather, it is usually recommended to also have storage
facilities. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on demand side management in consumer
collectives with community owned renewable energy generation and storage facilities
for effective integration of renewable energy with the existing fossil fuel-based power
supply system.
Effective integration of renewable energy should be able to not only reduce aggre-
gate demand for the energy generated by fossil fuel, but also to reduce peak demand
from the traditional power plants. To reduce peak demand, electric utilities use dif-
ferential pricing systems like time-of-use-pricing (where higher prices are charged at
times of expected high load). Thus, we want to minimize the electricity consumption
cost of the collective which reduces the consumption at times of peak demand and is
also of interest to the consumers. In particular, we study a collective of consumers in the
presence of a collectively owned renewable generation facility (e.g., solar panels) and a
collectively owned storage facility (e.g., battery). The electricity demand of the group
of consumers is fulfilled by renewable generation and the electricity market. A central
coordinator purchases electricity from the market on behalf of the consumers and also
makes decisions on the usage and storage of renewable energy. The consumers have
their individual private constraints and preferences, which they may not want to share
with other group members or the coordinator. The consumers make their consumption
decisions based on their private constraints and preferences. Our goal is to design co-
ordination algorithms so that the coordinator (with knowledge of the market price of
electricity and a forecast of the renewable generation) minimizes the total cost of elec-
tricity procurement of the collective by (a) managing the operation of the storage and
(b) shaping the consumers’ demand while allowing them to make their own decisions
about their electricity usage subject to their private constraints.
Although our problem can be formulated as an optimization problem, solving the
problem becomes challenging because of the lack of knowledge of the agents about
the whole problem. Each consumer only knows its own demand constraints but has no
knowledge about the constraints of other agents. The no knowledge assumption has
been shown to be a challenge in other group decision problems such as multi-agent
negotiation(e.g., [2, 3]). The coordinator also does not have any knowledge about the
agents’ constraints. Thus there is no agent who has all the “data” about the problem to
be solved. The only common knowledge is about the forecast of available renewable
energy (which we assume to be reasonably accurate) and the market price of electricity
over the planning horizon. These assumptions are reasonable for day ahead planning,
where the electricity is obtained from a day-ahead market and the weather forecast is
accurate enough to get a reasonable forecast. The coordinator is similar to a mediator in
a negotiation among the consumer collective (e.g., [4, 5]) who needs to search for the
optimal mediation protocol but also needs to decide the storage policy in our problem.
The coordinator is not a market maker or a traditional demand response aggregator,
but is akin to a social planner (similar to [6]). But the task of our coordinator is more
complicated: in addition to coordinating consumers’ demand, the coordinator has to
solve the coupled problem of designing a method for charging and discharging storage.
To solve the coupled demand and storage management problem, we design an iter-
ative algorithm consisting of two primary steps. In one step, the coordinator assumes
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a profile for charging and discharging the battery and uses virtual price signals to co-
ordinate the consumers to obtain an optimal demand profile. In the second step, the
coordinator uses the demand profile given by the consumers to compute an optimal
storage solution. In step one, through the use of the virtual price signal, we ensure that
(a) when each agent minimizes its own energy consumption cost, the total cost is also
minimized and (b) at the optimal solution, each agent’s virtual energy cost calculated
based on its virtual signal equals its real payment. Using (a) and (b) above, we prove
that our iterative algorithm converges to the optimal demand profile for the agents that
minimizes the total energy cost. Furthermore (b) above ensures that the total amount
that the agents pay is equal to the total electricity bill that the collective has to pay to
the utility (i.e., budget-balance is achieved). The design of this provably optimal budget-
balanced algorithm in the presence of limited knowledge is the key contribution of this
paper. We also performed simulations based on real world consumption data. We show
that the number of iterations taken for the agents to converge to the optimal solution is
not sensitive to the size of the cooperative.
2 Related Work
Our work is related to two streams of research: demand side and storage management.
There is extensive research about demand response programs for managing consumer
side demand, either through direct load control (DLC) or indirect incentive based con-
trol, such as real time prices (RTP) (see [7] and references therein). We will restrict
our discussion on how to design virtual price signals to incentivize consumer demand
shifting. The design of price signal is challenged by the possibility of the herding phe-
nomenon, whereby agents shift their consumptions towards the low price times simul-
taneously and thus cause a new spike in demand, thereby increasing the energy cost [8].
Previous work has proposed various heuristics. [9] uses an adaptive approach by send-
ing both price and control signals to agents to control the rate and frequency of agents
reacting to real-time prices so as to avoid simultaneous shifting. Unlike these papers,
we study the problem from the perspective of demand schedule planning. In addition,
we maintain privacy of consumers without relying on consumers learning and we keep
budget balance without charging any addition fees.
Most storage management problems can be classified into two categories: storage
management at the demand-side or at the supply-side. The demand-side storage man-
agement is related to how to coordinate end users each of whom owns a storage facil-
ity and makes overall decisions in terms of individual energy demand scheduling and
charging/discharing of individual owned batteries; e.g., [10, 11, 12, 13]. In contrast, in
our model, the storage facility is not operated at the individual level but at the aggre-
gate level: the coordinator who operates the storage facility finds it difficult to optimize
storage decisions for the whole group as he has no knowledge of the individual con-
sumption constraints and preferences.
Prior work on the supply-side storage management has focused on how to use
storage to stabilize the output of renewable energy supply when joining the conven-
tional electricity markets (e.g., [14, 15]), or to directly satisfy consumers demand (e.g.,
[16, 17]). A common setting in these papers is that the energy demand is exogenous and
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independent of storage operations. In contrast, in our problem, the demand pattern of
consumers is endogenously affected by the coordinator’s storage decisions and there-
fore the design of storage strategy should take into account the consumers’ response.
3 Problem Formulation
We consider a consumer collective with N members with the planning period divided
into M discrete time slots. A central coordinator purchases electricity on behalf of the
consumer collective from the market. The collective has a community owned renewable
energy generation facility (e.g., solar panels, wind mills) which can only supply a part
of the energy required by the collective. The collective also has a community owned
storage facility. The storage capacity is also less than the amount of energy required by
the collective. The coordinator is in charge of the storage and the generation facility.
We assume that the forecast for the amount of generation for the planning horizon is
accurate. Furthermore, the electricity prices from the market are also known. These
assumptions are reasonable for a 24 hour planning period with the electricity being
bought from a day-ahead market.
Let g be the forecast vector for the amount of electricity to be generated over the
M time slots with gj the energy generated in time slot j. There is an upper bound
on the amount of electricity that the agents can draw from the market (determined by
the physical constraints of the distribution infrastructure) denoted by h. Let p be the
market price vector which can vary over the M time slots. The component for the jth
time slots of h and p are denoted by hj and pj respectively. The market price and the
market supply capacity is common knowledge for the central coordinator and all the
agents in the group. Let R be an N ×M matrix where each row of the matrix, ri is
the electricity demand of the agent i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. We call ri the demand profile
of agent i. Each entry rij is the electricity demand of agent i for time slot j. The total
aggregated demand in time slot j is ρj =
∑N
i=1 rij .
The demand profile ri of each agent i must satisfy their individual constraints. We
will assume that the constraints on the demands are given by a constraint set Xi which
is private knowledge of the agent i. An agent does not share this constraint set Xi,
neither with other agents nor with the coordinator. Unless otherwise specified we
will assume Xi to be a convex polytope, which is a fairly general model for energy
consumption constraints in this setting [11, 6].
The central coordinator needs to make an energy storage decision. Specifically,
in each time slot j it needs to decide whether and how much to charge or discharge.
These (dis)charging decisions are represented by the (dis)charging amount at each time
slot, denoted by yj ∈ [−d, d] for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, where d denotes the maxi-
mum (dis)charging amount during each time slot, and if yj > 0, at time slot j, the
facility is charged with an amount of yj ; if yj ≤ 0, the facility is discharged by an
amount of −yj . The storage decision variable over the time horizon is the vector y.
Given the charging and discharging amount at each time slot, {yj}, the storage level
at the end of the time slot is
∑j
k=1 yk. The storage level at the end of each time
slot should be non-negative and also less than the capacity of the storage facility, de-
noted by u. Therefore, the charging and discharging decision is also constrained by
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k=1 yk ∈ [0, u] ,∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The constraints for storage decisions is a sys-
tem of linear inequalities:
0 ≤ Ay ≤ u, −d ≤ y ≤ d.
where A is a lower triangular matrix with elements 1, and 0, y = [y1, ...yj , ...yM ]
T ,
u = [u, ...u, ...u]
T and d = [d, ...d, ...d]T .
The amount of energy drawn from the market in time slot j is ρj + yj − gj . Thus
the energy cost is pj · (ρj + yj − gj). Since the objective is to minimize the sum of all
agents costs, the central demand scheduling problem can be written as:
minR,y C
s (R,y) :=
∑N
i=1 pj · (ρj + yj − gj)
s.t. ri ∈ Xi, rij ≥ 0
0 ≤ Ay ≤ u,−d ≤ y ≤ d
0 ≤ ρ+ y − g ≤ h
(1)
The operating cost associated with the renewable energy is assumed to be constant,
i.e., independent of the amount of energy produced, and is thus not a part of the ob-
jective function. Note that the above problem is defined on a convex set. Moreover, the
objective function is linear. Therefore, Problem (1) is a convex minimization problem
and is thus solvable optimally.
4 Solution Approach
While Problem (1) is solvable, the central coordinator could not directly determine
the optimal demand profile and the storage solution because he has no knowledge of
consumers’ consumption constraints Xi for any i ∈ 1, 2, ...N . We assume that the
coordinator affects the energy consumption plans of individual agents via virtual price
signals and the individual agents honestly report their optimal demand based on the
virtual price signals.
A simple virtual signal based on market price alone is ineffective to optimize co-
ordination because in our problem the aggregate supply also depends on the coordina-
tor’s storage choices. The optimal storage solution and the optimal demand profile are
coupled in the constraints and thus depend on each other. To address this issue, one ap-
proach is to decompose the problem into two subproblems: (1) optimizing the storage
solution given the demand profile (OSS); (2) optimizing the demand profile given the
storage solution (ODP). Correspondingly, we give two definitions:
Definition 1. σ : R→ y: the function maps demand profile to optimal storage solution.
Definition 2. δ : y→ R: the function maps storage policy to optimal demand profile.
We design the coordination algorithm as (see Figure 1):
1. Without storage, the central coordinator finds the demand of individual agents, R∗,
that minimizes the energy cost.
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2. OSS: Given the demand profile R∗, the central coordinator solves the optimal stor-
age solution, y∗ = σ(R∗), to minimize the energy cost.
3. ODP: Given the storage solution y∗, the central coordinator coordinates the de-
mand of individual agents, R] = δ(y∗), to minimize the energy cost.
Stopping Criterion If R] = R∗, stop. Otherwise, R∗ = R], and go back to step 2.
Note that step 1 is a special case of step 3 ODP with storage solution y∗ = 0. In
step 2 OSS, only central coordinator makes decision on the storage solution. In step 3
ODP, the central coordinator determines virtual price signal and the agents calculate
demand according to the virtual price signal.
Start 
Compute Optimal Demand  
without Storage, R∗ (ODP with y∗=0) 
OSS: Given Demand Profile, R∗  
Compute Optimal Storage Solution y∗ = σ(R∗) 
Stop 
R# = R∗? 
Yes 
R∗ = R# No 
ODP: Given Storage Policy, y∗  
Compute Optimal Demand Profile R# = δ(y∗) 
Fig. 1: Algorithm Overview
The basic intuition of the overall coordination algorithm is that after either step 2 or
step 3, the aggregate energy cost is reduced. Specifically, for step 2, given the new de-
mand profile, R∗, the new storage solution y∗ = σ(R∗) should give a lower aggregate
energy cost compared with the previous storage solution, because y∗ is the storage so-
lution minimizing the aggregate energy cost when the demand profile is R∗. By similar
argument, after step 3, the aggregate energy cost decreases too. Thus, the energy cost
continues to decrease during the execution of the overall coordination algorithm. We
will prove the basic algorithm keeps iterating and converges to the optimal solution to
problem (1) under realistic conditions.
5 Overall Coordination Algorithm
In this section, we describe step 2 and 3 our algorithm works and prove its convergence.
5.1 Optimal Storage Solution (OSS)
Given the demand profile, R∗, the central coordinator could optimize the storage solu-
tion by solving the problem below:
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miny C
s (R∗,y) =
∑N
i=1 pj · (ρ∗j + yj − gj)
s.t. 0 ≤ Ay ≤ u,−d ≤ y ≤ d
0 ≤ ρ∗ + y − g ≤ h
(2)
Problem 2 is a linear programming problem and thus solvable. By solving the prob-
lem 2, we can get the optimal storage solution y∗ = σ (R∗).
5.2 Optimal Demand Profile (ODP)
In this section we discuss how to induce the optimal demand profile given a storage
solution y∗. The corresponding problem is expressed as follows:
minR C
s (R,y∗) =
∑N
i=1 pj · (ρj + yj − gj)
s.t. ri ∈ Xi, rij ≥ 0
ρ+ y∗ − g ≤ h
(3)
The iterative algorithm to solve Problem 3 is:
1. The central coordinator sends initial virtual price signal, denoted by sij , to the
agents.
2. After receiving the virtual price signals, each agent individually calculates its opti-
mal demand profile ri by minimizing its energy cost computed based on the virtual
prices and reports its profiles back to the coordinator.
3. Based on the reported demand profile R, the central coordinator updates the virtual
price signal and sends the new signal to each agent.
4. Given the new price signal, each agent chooses its new demand profile r′i.
Stopping Criterion If R′ = R, stop. Otherwise, set R = R′ and start again from step
3.
In order to minimize the total electricity cost, the virtual price signal has to induce
consumers to shift their demands from time slots with high marginal cost to those with
low marginal cost and keep the aggregate demands within the capacity limits. There-
fore, first of all, we need to determine the marginal cost and the capacity limit of the
electricity in each time slot. In our model there are three possible electricity sources:
on-site generations, storage and the market. While the marginal cost of electricity from
generations and the market is well defined, we need to find a method to calculate the
marginal cost of electricity from storage.
First Charging First Discharging (FCFD) We use first charging first discharg-
ing (FCFD) method to calculate the marginal unit cost of the energy discharged from
storage. The FCFD policy in our setting means that the electricity charged earliest is
recorded as discharged first. Below we use an example to show how the FCFD policy
works. Assume there are 5 time slots, and the prices p are {10, 20, 40, 10, 30}. The stor-
age solution y is {3, 8,−10, 4,−5}, which implies the electricity is charged in time slot
1, 2, 4 and discharged in time slot 3, 5. Under the FCFD policy, the electricity charged
earliest is recorded as discharged first. Therefore, the 10 units of electricity discharged
in time slot 3 should consist two parts, i.e., 3 units charged in time slot 1 at price p1 = 10
and 7 unit charged in time slot 2 at price p2 = 20. The corresponding average price for
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the electricity discharged in time slot 3 should be (10×3+20×7)/10 = 17. Similarly,
the 5 units of electricity discharged in time slot 5 should consist of two parts, i.e., 1
unit charged in time slot 2 at price p2 = 20 and 4 units charged in time slot 4 at price
p4 = 10. The corresponding average price should be (20× 1 + 10× 4)/5 = 12.
Thus, we can calculate the average price of electricity discharged in each time
slot. The unit cost of the energy discharged in each time slot should be the average
cost of the corresponding energy still in the inventory and charged earliest. We use
pFCFDj (R
∗,y∗) to denote the unit cost or the price of the discharging energy in time
slot j with demand profile R∗ and storage solution y∗.
Cost Structure Next we define the cost structure of the electricity in each time slot
j, pˆj (r), in an increasing order. By the following proposition 1, in each time slot, the
unit cost of electricity from storage, pFCFDj (R
∗,y∗), is smaller than the unit cost of
electricity from market pj .
Proposition 1. If the storage solution, y∗, is the optimal storage solution given demand
profile, R∗, then pFCFDj (R
∗,y∗) < pj .
Thus, the cost structure of the energy under the demand profile R∗ and the storage
solution y∗ should be
pˆj (r) =

∞ z3j < r ≤ z4j
pj z2j < r ≤ z3j
pFCFDj (R
∗,y∗) z1j < r ≤ z2j
0 z0j < r ≤ z1j
where z0j = 0, z1j = gj , z2j = max{gj , gj − yj}, z3j = hj + gj − yj , z4j =∞.
Initial Virtual Price Signal After we derive the formula of marginal cost, a straight-
forward approach is to set a quota for different sources in each time slot j for each agent
i. Thus, the price signal is
sij (r) =

∞ z3ij < r ≤ z4ij
pj z2ij < r ≤ z3ij
pFCFDj (R
∗,y∗) z1ij < r ≤ z2ij
0 z0ij < r ≤ z1ij
The initial quota of electricity from each resource in time slot j for agent i is pro-
portional to agent i’s demand in time slot j, rij (using aggregate demand ri for first
iteration without previous R∗). Therefore, the corresponding thresholds in the initial
virtual price signal are:
zkij =
r∗ij∑N
i=1 r
∗
ij
zkj , k = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4
Individual Agent’s Problem After receiving the virtual price signal, each agent i
computes ri from
min
M∑
j=1
sij (rij) rij , s.t. ri ∈ Xi, rij ≥ 0. (4)
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The above problem is a convex optimization problem and thus solvable. However, due
to individual constraints, some agents might not use all the quota assigned to them,
while others may need more quota to further reduce their energy costs. Thus we need
to update the virtual price signals accordingly.
Update Rule of Virtual Price Signal If the agent i does not fully use the quota
assigned to her at time slot j, it may be due to either (a) constraints on electricity
consumption or (b) lower price in other time slots. In either case, as long as the quotas
on other time slots don’t become smaller, which enforces agent i to shift the energy
consumption from other time slots to time slot j, agent i prefers to keep the current
consumption level to minimize the energy cost. Moreover, if the quotas on other time
slots become larger, agent i may prefer to shift demand from time slot j to other time
slot to reduce the energy cost. It is true if the prices on the time slots with larger quotas
are lower than current marginal energy cost in time slot j. Therefore, to reduce the
individual agent’s energy cost and thus reduce the aggregate energy cost, the central
coordinator needs to construct a new price signal by adjusting the quotas so as to share
the excess quota among agents who use all of the quota in a time slot j. The new quotas
for a demand profile R are determined by: let for k = 1, 2, 3, Φkj = {i|rij < zkij},
z′kij =

rij i ∈ Φkj
rij
(
zkj−
∑
i∈Φj rij
)
∑
i∈Φj∪Ψj rij
i 6∈ Φkj
Under the new virtual price signal, for either electricity from generation or market
supply, the agents give up their excess quota to the agents who use all of the quota with
a sharing rule based on the current consumption level. Then the agents can continue
optimizing their consumption schedule to reduce energy cost as they may get more
quota in the time slots when they use all quota assigned to them previously.
5.3 Convergence Analysis
First, we prove the convergence of the ODP algorithm.
Theorem 1. The ODP algorithm always converges.
Theorem 1 is an immediate result of the two lemmas below:
Lemma 1. The energy cost of individual agent based on the virtual price signal,∑M
j=1 sij (rij) rij , is non-increasing during the execution of the iterative algorithm,
so is the aggregate cost based on the virtual price signal,
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 sij (rij) rij .
Lemma 2. If ∀i, j, rij > z2ij , i.e., every agent use all quota of the electricity supply
from energy generation and storage, then the aggregate cost based on the virtual price
signal,
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 sij (rij) rij , is equal to the aggregate cost based on the market
price, Cs (R,y∗) =
∑N
i=1 pj · (ρj + yj − gj).
We now prove the convergence of the overall algorithm.
Theorem 2. The overall algorithm always converges.
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Proof. From Definition 1, we have Cs (R, σ (R)) < Cs (R,y), if y 6= σ (R). Also,
from Theorem 1, we have Cs
(
R],y
)
< Cs (R∗,y), if R] 6= R∗. Thus the energy
cost Cs (R,y) is strictly decreasing as long as the optimal storage solution or optimal
demand profile changes after each iteration. Thus, this algorithm converges.
Theorem 3. R∗ is optimal demand profile with storage, if y∗ = σ (R∗) and 0 < %∗ +
y∗ − g < h.
Proof. Since 0 < %∗+y∗+g < h, 0 ≤ %∗+y+g ≤ h is not binding in the problem of
optimal storage solution, which means y∗ is also the solution to the following problem:
miny C
s (R∗,y)− Cs (R∗,0) =∑Ni=1 pj · yj
s.t. 0 ≤ AY ≤ u,−d ≤ y ≤ d (5)
Similarly, R∗ is also the solution to the following problem:
minR C
s (R,y∗)− Cs (0,y∗) =∑Ni=1 pj · ρj
s.t. ri ∈ Xi, rij ≥ 0 (6)
Assume C∗ is the minimum cost of Problem (1) and C# is the minimum cost of the
following problem:
minR,y C
s (R,y) :=
∑N
i=1 pj · (ρj + yj − gj)
s.t. ri ∈ Xi, rij ≥ 0
0 ≤ AY ≤ u,−d ≤ y ≤ d
(7)
Since problem (1) has more constraints than problem (7), we have C∗ ≥ C#.
Moreover, by looking at problem (7), it actually can be decomposed to problem (6) and
problem (5). Therefore, as we already show that y∗ is also solution to problem (5) when
0 < %∗ + y∗ < h, (R∗,y∗) is the optimal solution to problem (7), i.e., Cs (R∗,y∗) =
C#. As C∗ ≥ C#, we have Cs (R∗,y∗) = C# ≤ C∗. Moreover, (R∗,y∗) also
satisfies all of the constraints in problem (1), which implies Cs (R∗,y∗) ≥ C∗. Thus,
Cs (R∗,y∗) = C∗, i.e., (R∗,y∗) is the optimal solution to problem (1).
6 Simulation
In this section, we perform simulations to show the performance of our algorithm. We
first state our assumptions on consumers’ demand features, central coordinator’s energy
generation facility and storage facility, and the structure of market electricity price.
To reflect this diversity of the consumers’ demand within the simulations, we used
the Irish Commission for Energy Regulation (CER) electricity consumption data set to
identify two important classes of consumers with shared characteristics. Here, Class 1
represents consumers that consume most of their electricity during the day and have a
low load at night, whereas Class 2 represents consumers that have a stable consumption
during the day, but have a higher consumption at night. We assume there are N agents,
among them half are of Class 1 and the other half are of Class 2. Moreover, each agent
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Table 1: Average Performance of Coordination Algorithm
Number of Number of Convergence
Agents rounds Accuracy (%)
20 11.30 99.74
40 11.42 99.67
60 12.18 99.63
80 12.58 99.69
100 15.02 99.62
is defined by its total electricity requirement over the whole planning horizon, ri, and
the agent’s constraints that determine the distribution of electricity consumption over
the planning horizon.
For the market price, we use the real market prices from the EEX dat setwhich
is the average hourly day-ahead spot market prices gathered from the European Energy
Exchange as the price input, p. These prices are fixed across all the simulations. The
capacity of the electricity contract on the other hand are not fixed. The capacity of
market supply is determined by hj = 1.2
∑N
i=1 xij . The simulations were considered
to converge when the cost reduction in one iteration got less than 0.001%.
Table 1 shows how the number of iterations and the convergence accuracy measured
by the average share of potential cost reduction achieved changes with the number of
agents. The results indicate the scalability of our algorithm with respect to the number
of agents.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel multiagent coordination algorithm to shape the energy
consumption of a consumer collective in the presence of energy generation and storage.
In the collective, a central coordinator buys the electricity and decides the energy stor-
age level for the whole group, and consumers make their own consumption decisions
based on their private consumption constraints and preferences. To coordinate individ-
ual consumers under incomplete information and optimize the energy storage decision,
we decompose the problem to two sub-problems: (a) optimizing demand profile of con-
sumers given storage policy and (b) optimizing storage solution given demand profile of
consumers. We proposed an iterative algorithm in which the two sub-problems above
are solved alternately. We proved that our algorithm converges to the central optimal
solution.
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